State of Play
AFC Bournemouth's estimated squad cost ratio is 71.5% against the 70% limit that applies to clubs in UEFA competition, putting them roughly £4.4m/yr OVER the line — first European season, first breach of the tighter cap that comes with it. The summer 2026 window stands at £6.7m banked from sales against £52.4m committed on signings. Every figure here is this tracker's own estimate, built from published accounts and media reporting, as reported 09 Aug 2026.
The Clock — What's Counting Down
6 SEP
~2 SEP · UEFA EST
OCT 2026
31 DEC · CALENDAR 2026
The Six Regulations — Pass / Fail / Room Left
Quick Answers — Bournemouth's Finances in Plain English
Are Bournemouth in trouble with FFP in 2026?
No. The club has never been charged under the Premier League's PSR, and the three-year cycle that closed 30 June 2026 is estimated comfortably inside the £105m limit — roughly £250m of player sales across 2025 and 2026 saw to that. The new frontier is UEFA: a first-ever European qualification puts Bournemouth under the squad cost ratio and Football Earnings Rule for the first time.
What is Bournemouth's squad cost ratio right now?
Roughly 67% on this tracker's estimates, against the 70% limit — squad cost (player wages + amortisation + agent fees) over football revenue plus average player-trading profit. UEFA tests calendar year 2026 (freezing 31 December); the Premier League tests the 2026/27 season with an October checkpoint. UEFA publishes no club ratios, so treat every figure here as a model, not a measurement.
How did Bournemouth pass PSR so easily?
The selling machine. FY25 booked £91m of player-sale profits (Solanke to Spurs and Huijsen to Real Madrid); FY26 added an estimated £150m+ more — Semenyo £62.5m to Man City in January, Zabarnyi to PSG, Ouattara to Brentford, Kerkez to Liverpool. Sale profits land in the books instantly; the replacements amortise over five years. That asymmetry is the whole trick.
Can Bournemouth spend this summer?
Yes — and with no gate, embargo or settlement condition in the way. The constraint is arithmetic: on the model defaults there's ~£8m/yr of squad-cost headroom left under the 70% line, which converts to roughly £40m of fees on five-year contracts before wages. Rodríguez (£21.5m), Silva (£21.5m) and Juanlu Sánchez (£9.4m, announced 6 Aug) have eaten most of what July opened with.
What's the homegrown problem with the Europa League squad list?
UEFA's List A allows 25 players only if 8 are "locally trained" — and at most 4 of those may be association-trained (three years at any English club aged 15–21) rather than club-trained (three years at Bournemouth). The Cherries have association-trained players (Cook, Scott, Tavernier, Brooks, Doak, Forster) but essentially no club-trained seniors, so the first list in club history is likely capped around 21–22 names.
Have Bournemouth ever been punished under financial rules?
Once, a decade ago. The 2014/15 Championship title season carried a £38.3m loss against a £6m allowance; the Football League fined the club £7.6m in 2016, settled at £4.75m in July 2018. Nothing since — no PSR charges, no UEFA history at all. The full story is on the Sanctions tab.
Incomings & Outgoings
Summer 2026 window (opened 15 June, closes 1 September — delayed by the World Cup). A deal enters this table at a medical and not before: ADVANCED means terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, DONE means a club has announced it. Anything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives on the Rumours tab. Marco Rose's first window as head coach. Fees per media reports; anything short of officially announced is flagged.
Summer 2026 — Out
| Player | To | Fee £m | Wage £k/wk | Cost freed £m/yr | Profit £m | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Summer 2026 — In
| Player | From | Fee £m | Wage £k/wk | SCR cost £m/yr | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025/26 Season — In (Summer 25 + Jan 26)
| Player | From | Fee £m | Window |
|---|
2025/26 Season — Out
| Player | To | Fee £m | Window |
|---|
Spending Headroom
"Room" means two things for Bournemouth: the UEFA 70% squad cost ratio (calendar year 2026 — the club's first-ever UEFA test), and the PL SCR — which for clubs in Europe is ALSO capped at 70% (season basis, red threshold 100%). There is no List A gate, embargo or settlement condition: the ceiling is pure arithmetic. The model below is adjustable — the defaults are my estimates, so put your own numbers in.
The window so far — fees in vs out
The Fined Four — the CFCB Round of 30 June 2026, and Why It Matters Here
Four English clubs were fined in UEFA's 30 June 2026 decisions — the rulebook Bournemouth just signed up to by qualifying. Same rules, very different situations.
| Club | 2026 Fine | Suspended | Breach | Settlement | Exit Route |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aston Villa | £19.4m | £12.9m | SCR 2025 ("significant") · 2nd straight | 4-yr to 2028/29 · £9.5m paid 2025 · trend formally ENDORSED | £144m of player-sale profits + record Visit Rwanda deal — selling the squad's appreciation |
| Chelsea | £2.6m | — | SCR · repeat | 4-yr · £26.7m paid, up to £51m conditional | Academy sales (pure profit) + intra-group hotel sales the PL accepted — and now the Rogers/Garnacho tightrope |
| Newcastle | £2.6m + £8.6m | — | BOTH SCR and FER — the double | Obligations continue despite missing Europe | Isak to Liverpool for £125m — one sale to rule the FY25 accounts |
| Nottingham Forest | £2.2m | — | SCR | — | Anderson to City for £116m weeks later — fine dwarfed 53:1 by one transfer |
Annual constraint — squad cost ratio model
Squad cost = player & coach wages + transfer amortisation + agent fees. Denominator = football revenue + player-trading profit (3-yr average, per UEFA's smoothing). Edit any figure:
What-if: add a signing
Rumour Mill
The window shut at 11pm on 1 September 2026, and this tab is now mostly history. Nothing below can become an incoming transfer until January: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, so every inbound link here is closed rather than pending, however well sourced it was. Three things the deadline does not close, which is why the cards are kept live rather than swept away. Free agents — a player already out of contract can be signed and registered outside the window. Outgoing moves abroad — several leagues closed later than England, so a player could still leave after English clubs had stopped buying: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September, the Süper Lig closed on 4 September and MLS on 2 September. Seven cards on this site point at one of those and are still live; every other card is now marked JANUARY and priced as a January deal rather than one that can happen today. Academy moves — an under-18 joining on training compensation is not moving a professional registration and is not bound by this deadline. Cards are left in place because a rumour that died at the deadline is a record of what was reported and what it was worth, and deleting them would quietly improve this site’s hit rate. The tick-box model still works: a JANUARY card prices what the deal would cost when the window reopens, which is the question actually worth asking about a link that survived the summer.
Everything on this tab is short of a medical. That is the line: a deal that has reached one sits in the Ins & Outs table, and everything below it — an offer, an agreement in principle, personal terms with no fee agreed, a bid lodged — is here, counting towards nothing until it moves. Tick any combination of live rumours (fees and wages are my estimates of reported figures) and the panel at the bottom recalculates the effect on every rule: window balance, UEFA 70%, PL SCR (also 70% for clubs in Europe) and FER earnings. Uses the same base assumptions as the Headroom tab, so tweaks there flow through here. The defining tension of Rose's first window: the club wants to KEEP its saleable assets for a European push, while Europe's biggest clubs circle exactly those assets. Removed on 5 August: the Kroupi exit rumour, killed by a fractured metatarsal and a club line that he was never for sale.
Incoming rumours
Outgoing rumours
Squad · Book Value & Amortisation
Senior squad after this summer's confirmed exits. Book value is computed live: straight-line amortisation of the reported fee from signing date to current contract end (extensions re-spread the remaining value — this is the standard treatment). Fees are media-reported (several undisclosed, marked ~); wages are third-party estimates (Capology-style), not official. Tap a column to sort.
| Player | Pos | Fee £m | Signed | Contract End | Yrs Left | Amort £m/yr | Book Value £m | Mkt Val £m | Profit If Sold £m | Est Wage £k/wk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Amortisation Runway — What's Already Committed
Transfer-fee amortisation locked into future seasons from today's contracts (straight-line on remaining book value), plus an estimated slice of conditional add-ons (Rodríguez, Silva, Juanlu, Diakité, Rayan) landing from FY27. This is spending that's already eaten before Bournemouth buy anyone else.
Premier League homegrown quota — 2026/27
Two ceilings, not one. A club may register 25 senior players, and no more than 17 of them may be non-homegrown. The familiar “eight homegrown” line is what falls out of those two numbers — but only if you fill all 25. A club with six qualifiers is not breaking any rule; it simply cannot name a squad bigger than 23. Under-21s sit outside the list altogether and play regardless: for 2026/27, born on or after 1 January 2005. Players out on loan are not registered.
Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test. Three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which the player turns 21. That is why David Brooks qualifies — Welsh, and the FAW counts equally — while Ryan Christie does not: Inverness and Celtic are Scottish FA clubs, and Bournemouth came at 26.
UEFA List A — 2026/27 Europa League
The first UEFA squad list in AFC Bournemouth's history, due ~2 September (est — UEFA confirms the exact deadline with the league-phase draw on 28 August; first matchday 16–17 September). The rule that bites: 25 places are only available if 8 are "locally trained" — and at most 4 of those may be association-trained (any English club, ages 15–21) rather than club-trained (three years at Bournemouth). Every unfilled club-trained place is a list spot lost.
Building List A №1 · Position by Position
Projection from the current squad — a late signing reshuffles everything. HG = homegrown/association-trained for UEFA purposes (trained in England aged 15–21, any club).
Goalkeepers
Defenders
Midfielders — the homegrown core
Forwards
Sanction Tracker — The (Nearly) Clean Sheet
The SCR Glidepath — Arriving Under the Bar
The original sin — a £38.3m Championship loss
Eddie Howe's side win the Championship and reach the Premier League for the first time — spending £30.4m on wages against £12.9m of turnover to do it. The Football League's FFP rules allowed a maximum deviation of £6m; Bournemouth posted a £38.3m loss.
Fined £7.6m by the Football League
The EFL levies a £7.6m fine for the promotion-season breach. Bournemouth dispute it — the club's position: the losses were a calculated, owner-funded promotion push, not deception.
Settled at £4.75m — full and final
Club and EFL agree a £4.75m settlement of all claims for the 2014/15 breach, the league acknowledging there was "no deliberate attempt to infringe the rules or to deceive". Still the only financial sanction in the club's history.
PSR: never charged, never close
Across relegation (2020), promotion (2022) and consolidation, Bournemouth have never faced a PSR charge. The cycle just closed (FY24 −£66.3m, FY25 +£14.9m, FY26 est strongly positive) sits an estimated £100m+ inside the £105m limit before deductions — player-sale profits made the test trivial. Final-ever PSR assessment: January 2027.
6th place — and a new rulebook
A club-record 57-point season delivers the Europa League: the first European qualification in Bournemouth's history. The prize carries a regulatory bill — UEFA's SCR (calendar 2026), FER (three-year monitoring), List A quotas and the Premier League's 70% tier all switch on at once.
Nothing pending — the watchlist is prospective
No charges, no settlement, no suspended penalties, no embargoes. What this tracker watches instead: the est high-60s squad cost ratio's dependence on continued trading profits, the first FER submission, homegrown quota pressure on List A, and the October 2026 PL SCR checkpoint. First CFCB verdicts on calendar-2026 numbers land in summer 2027.
Last Accounts — FY2024/25 (y/e 30 June 2025)
The season of 9th place — equalling the club's best-ever finish, then beating it on points (56) — plus an FA Cup quarter-final. Headline: a first pre-tax profit of the Foley era, £14.9m. Engine: £91m of player-sale gains — Dominic Solanke's ~£65m move to Spurs and Dean Huijsen's £50m release-clause exit to Real Madrid both fell inside the year. Filed spring 2026 (AFC Bournemouth Limited); FY26 accounts land ~spring 2027.
Revenue mix (approx.)
How the loss became a profit
| Operating loss (est — staff £158.4m + amortisation ~£69m + other running costs against £181.7m revenue) | ~−£71m |
| Profit on player sales (Solanke → Spurs ~£65m in Aug 2024 and Huijsen → Real Madrid £50m on 1 Jun 2025) | +£91.0m |
| Net interest & other (est) | ~−£5m |
| Pre-tax profit | +£14.9m |
Rules & Compliance Status
Every regime that applies to Bournemouth, the limit in pounds, and where the club stands. "FFP" itself no longer exists as a single rule — it's the old umbrella name, now split into UEFA's FER + SCR and the Premier League's PSR (becoming SCR + SSR). Qualifying for Europe means the UEFA half of this page applies to Bournemouth for the first time.
Compliance calendar
PSR — Profitability & Sustainability
SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (UEFA)
FER — Football Earnings Rule
SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (PL)
SSR — Sustainability & Systemic Resilience
List A — 25-man list & homegrown quotas
Swap-Deal / Player-Exchange Rule
FFP → what it means now
Amortisation & "pure profit"
The Whole League — Bean Counted
All 20 clubs for 2026/27: which SCR tier they're in, their latest published accounts (FY2024/25, y/e mid-2025), and their compliance baggage. Nine clubs in Europe carry the 70% green / 100% red caps; the other eleven get 85% / 115%. Notes updated 9 Aug — officially announced deals and appointments only; pursuits and links stay in the Rumour Mill. Figures marked ~ are estimates from league-wide analyses rather than confirmed line items — FY25 league totals: £6.8bn revenue, £4.4bn wages, £2.0bn amortisation, £948m aggregate pre-tax losses.
| Club | Europe 26/27 | Green cap | Rev £m | Wages £m | W/R | Compliance notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Arsenal | CL · CHAMPIONS | 70% | ~617 | ~328 | ~53% | Comfortable on both ratios; CL runners-up 25/26. Amortisation £170m+ the main cost line. |
Manchester City | CL | 70% | ~715 | 408 | ~57% | New era: Maresca replaces Guardiola. Broke the British record for Forest’s Anderson (£116m, fixed fee) — absorbed inside 70% by a £715m revenue base. |
Manchester United | CL | 70% | ~666 | ~313 | ~47% | Carrick made permanent manager; ~£85m midfield rebuild (Santos £50m, Tielemans £35m from Villa). £196m amortisation, but a £666m denominator makes 70% easy. |
Aston Villa | CL · EL HOLDERS | 70% | 378 | 273 | 72% | Mid-settlement with UEFA: fined twice (€22.5m/£19.4m on 30 Jun 26, €15m of it suspended, trend endorsed), and the £117m British-record Rogers sale is the exit route. |
Liverpool | CL | 70% | ~614 | ~386 | ~63% | Iraola officially appointed (4 Jun, 2-yr deal) as Slot's successor a year on from the title. FY25 wages inflated by title bonuses after £241m on Isak (£125m) & Wirtz. Squad cost £545m, big denominator. |
AFC Bournemouth | EUROPA · FIRST EVER | 70% | 182 | 158 | 87% | The subject of this tracker: first-ever Europe drags them from 85% to the 70% cap just as Iraola leaves for Liverpool and Rose arrives. ~£52m spent so far (Álvaro Rodríguez £21.5m, António Silva £21.5m, Juanlu Sánchez £9.4m announced 6 Aug). Headline W/R is ugly; the trading machine (est ~£95m/yr avg sale profit) is what keeps the SCR inside the line. See every other tab. |
Sunderland | EUROPA | 70% | ~180* | ~95* | ~53% | *FY25 = first PL season back. Europe two seasons after League One — the 70% cap lands on a still-growing revenue base. |
Crystal Palace | EUROPA · CONF WINNERS | 70% | ~190 | ~135 | ~71% | Conference League winners — then Glasner officially departed for Forest. Second straight European season keeps them on the 70% cap — the other "squeezed by success" club alongside Bournemouth. |
Brighton & Hove Albion | CONFERENCE | 70% | ~222 | ~165 | ~74% | FY25 costs rose sharply on amortisation; historically balanced by elite player trading profits. |
Chelsea | — | 85% | ~541 | ~360 | ~67% | Xabi Alonso era. UEFA settlement (£26.7m paid, up to £51m conditional), fined again on 30 Jun 2026 (€3m, mostly conditional) — then broke their record for Rogers (£117m) days after loaning Garnacho to Villa, walking the swap-rule tightrope. League-high £212m amortisation; missing Europe eases the cap to 85%. |
Newcastle United | — | 85% | ~350 | ~220 | ~63% | Fined on 30 Jun 2026 for BOTH SCR and FER breaches (€3m squad-cost fine plus a €10m FER settlement, €7m of it conditional); FY25 leaned on selling Isak to Liverpool for £125m. Settlement obligations continue despite missing Europe. |
Tottenham Hotspur | — | 85% | ~526 | ~222 | ~42% | Lowest wage ratio among the big-revenue clubs — the league's most comfortable bean-counting position. |
Nottingham Forest | — | 85% | ~190 | ~155 | ~82% | Fined €2.5m/£2.2m on 30 Jun 2026 — then banked £116m selling Anderson to City, transforming the FER/PSR picture overnight. Glasner confirmed as head coach 6 Jul (reported club-record ~£13m/yr salary) — their FIFTH boss in 12 months. |
Everton | — | 85% | ~187 | ~160 | ~86% | Two PSR deductions in 23/24; new stadium revenue is the plan for growing under the 85% cap. |
Fulham | — | 85% | ~180 | ~145 | ~81% | Small-revenue cohort where 85% barely funds a competitive XI — the other side of the SCR squeeze. |
Brentford | — | 85% | ~195 | ~125 | ~64% | The sustainability model club — comfortable margin on every metric. |
Leeds United | — | 85% | ~150* | ~110* | ~73% | *FY25 = promotion season. Second PL season consolidating. |
Coventry City | PROMOTED · CHAMPIONS | 85% | ~45* | ~35* | ~78% | *Championship-era accounts. PL broadcast money transforms the denominator overnight — big headroom if they spend sensibly. |
Ipswich Town | PROMOTED | 85% | ~145* | ~115* | ~79% | *FY25 reflects their last PL season. Straight back up at the first attempt. |
Hull City | PROMOTED · PLAY-OFFS | 85% | ~30* | ~28* | ~93% | *Championship accounts. The biggest financial step-up in the division — SSR liquidity tests bite hardest here. In: Butland, ex-Villa Targett, Zambrano & Morita. |
Who's Selling to Survive — Net Transfer Balance
Sorted by net balance — the top of this table is where the selling pressure lives, the bottom is where the money goes.
Can Anyone Still Catch the Big Six?
The question underneath every number in this tracker. The honest answer: the old door is bricked up — but there's a turnstile, and Bournemouth have just put a coin in it.
Why it feels closed — because it mostly is
The 70% rule is a percentage of revenue — so it doesn't cap spending, it caps spending relative to income. City's 70% of ~£715m buys a ~£500m squad; Bournemouth's 70% of ~£290m (with the trading profit counted) buys ~£200m. The gap is locked in by design. And the FER kills the only ladder anyone ever actually climbed: Abramovich's Chelsea, early City, even Newcastle's takeover surge all spent ahead of revenue — exactly what's now illegal. The clubs at the top climbed the ladder, then wrote rules that pulled it up. Worse, the compliance machinery itself transfers talent upward: Bournemouth's own route to a compliant 6th place ran through selling Semenyo to City and Zabarnyi to PSG. The efficient feed the rich.
The cracks in the door
1 · Grow the denominator. Every £1 of new revenue is 70p of new squad allowance — which is why the Vitality Stadium expansion (11,286 → 20,000+; ~£50m per the club, up to ~£85m per industry estimates), the Vitality shirt deal and every Europa League tie matter as much as any signing. Compliant growth means revenue first, squad second. 2 · The trading engine. Net transfer profit counts IN the denominator and in FER earnings — selling well literally raises your cap. Brighton ran this loop for a decade; Bournemouth's recruitment machine (Huijsen, Zabarnyi, Kerkez, Ouattara, Semenyo: ~£250m banked in two years) is now the league's best version of it. 3 · Efficiency is legal. Second-lowest five-year net spend in the division and a 6th-place finish — the table above is proof you can reach Europe on brains. 4 · The rich can now fail permanently. United's £650m for one top-four finish used to be survivable — just spend again. Under squad-cost rules, mistakes consume finite headroom even for giants. Bad buying is finally fatal at every level.
Changelog
Every update to the Bean Counter's data, newest first. Maintained manually with each rebuild.
Twenty-six sold players were sitting in “Retained” columns across fifteen clubs SITE-WIDE CORRECTION
Villa’s board was not the exception. It was the one somebody happened to be looking at. After Emiliano Martínez was found under “Retained” four days after his sale to Chelsea, the same pattern was checked across the other nineteen pages. Every club page carries these position boards — three columns each, who left, who stayed, who arrived — and at roughly forty-five chips a page that is about nine hundred hand-written claims, none of which any gate on this site could read, because they name players in free HTML rather than through a data array.
Twenty-six of them said a player had stayed when the club’s own deal table said he had been sold. The list is not marginal. Rodri sat under Manchester City’s “Retained · 6” tagged “REAL MADRID TALKS”; he had gone to Barcelona for £51m. Tijjani Reijnders (£52m, Al Qadsiah) and Nico González (£50m, Newcastle) were beside him. Carlos Baleba was retained at Brighton after a £65m move to Manchester United. Liam Delap was retained at Chelsea after £45m to Forest. Everton had five in one page — Ndiaye, McNeil, Beto, Iroegbunam and Patterson. Arsenal had Gabriel Jesus, Ipswich three, Hull two, Palace two, and so on across fifteen clubs.
Each one is now in the column it belongs in, with the destination and fee taken from the deal table rather than retyped. Column counts were recomputed from the chips actually present, so the headings match their own contents for the first time in a while. “Out · 0 — Nobody” placeholders were removed where a real departure now fills the column.
Worth recording how nearly this went wrong, because it is the second time today. The first script moved the chips and reported twenty-two successes. It had in fact deleted all twenty-two players: the insertion point never matched, the removal did, and the counts were recomputed afterwards so every column looked internally consistent. Nothing in the output said anything was missing. It was caught by reading one board back rather than by trusting the tally, and reverted. The rewrite asserts the set of names in a board before and after the edit and refuses to write when they differ — which then immediately caught a second, smaller error, and later a third: the pattern used to find a column was swallowing the last chip’s closing tag, so the final name in every column was invisible, which is why four clubs looked clean on the first pass and were not.
And a gate, the twenty-fifth. tools/check-flowboards.js asserts two things about every chip on every board: a name in a retained column must not be a completed permanent sale in that page’s OUT26, and a name in a retained column must exist in that page’s data at all. It says nothing about incoming or outgoing columns, where naming a target from another club is correct, and it exempts chips whose own tag places them outside the squad table — a third-choice keeper in contract talks, a U21 needing no registration. Its first run reported seventy-one problems, of which twenty-four were its own fault: typographic apostrophes it could not match to straight ones, and editorial labels like “Third keeper slot” that are not players. Tested against the pre-fix pages, where it finds exactly twenty-six.
The reason this sat unseen is worth stating plainly. The deal arrays are gated. The ratio inputs are gated. The squad table is gated. The answer block, the league tables and the share cards are all derived. These boards were the one substantial thing on every club page that was neither derived nor checked — prose in the shape of a table, in a heavily-read tab — and they had been drifting for as long as they have existed. It took a reader with the live page open to find the first one.
The Saudi deadline was five weeks out, and it is four days CORRECTION
This morning’s work put the Saudi Pro League window at 12 October and built a countdown, a gate and seven card tags on it. A reader said that sounded wrong — they had read it was days away. They were right.
The sources disagree. Wikipedia and Goal put the registration period at 22 July to 6 September; one tracker says 11 September; Sports Mole and AgentFlow say 12 October. The tell is arithmetic: 22 July to 12 October is 11.7 weeks, essentially FIFA’s twelve-week maximum for a registration period. That reads like somebody published the longest period permissible rather than the date actually announced. 6 September is 6.6 weeks, an ordinary window.
It is now carried at 6 September — the earliest credible date, chosen deliberately. The conservative error here is the early one: saying a shut window is open invents deals, which is the exact failure the window gate was written this morning to prevent. The countdown now reads four days rather than forty.
What is still unresolved: no source reachable from here separates Saudi domestic registration from international, so no such split is modelled. If one exists it is the international deadline that governs a sale out of England, and 12 October may well be a domestic-only extension rather than simply wrong. The date is flagged as contested on the deadline page rather than asserted.
Worth naming the pattern: the 12 October figure came from a single search result, and the source family it came from has now been wrong four times in this project — Hincapié’s fee, Trafford’s club, Fofana’s club, and this. A date that anchors a gate deserved a second source before it was written into twenty-one pages.
The window is shut, and the site now says so — except where it isn’t CORRECTION
The Premier League window closed at 11pm on 1 September, so from the 2nd no rumour card here can describe a signing as something still pending: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, however well sourced the link was. 139 cards are now marked JANUARY and priced as January deals rather than deals that can be done today.
But “the window” is not one thing, and flattening it would be the opposite error. A club that cannot buy can still sell: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September and the Süper Lig to the 4th; MLS closed on the 2nd. Bundesliga clubs finished earliest, on 31 August; Serie A, LaLiga and the Premier League all shut on the 1st. Six cards survive because they point at a league that outlasted England’s, and each has had its destination narrowed to the club that can actually still act. The seventh has already gone. Leon Bailey, whose card read “Al Diriyah” after Sevilla and Hull ran out of time, signed for Olympiacos on 2 September for £3.4m — which is the point of this section in one transfer. The English window shutting does not stop an English club selling, and it did not stop this one. It also proves a window this table does not list: Greece was still open on 2 September, and no closing date for it could be sourced, so none is stored rather than guessed.
The first countdown clock had been reading DONE against a label saying “days to window close”. It now counts to the Saudi deadline on 6 September — the one transfer deadline that still constrains these clubs, because they can still sell into it.
tools/check-window-state.js holds it: a card with no jan flag is asserting the deal can happen now, so its destination must sit in a window open today. It is date-driven rather than a one-off sweep — on 5 September the Türkiye cards stop being live and the gate says so without anyone remembering. It found six on Fulham that the first pass missed, because those rows are written with double quotes where the rest of the site uses single.
The countdown gate had a matching blind spot: it skipped any page without a club nav and only knew one label shape, so deadline/ was invisible to it — and was still counting to 1am on 1 October, the exact GMT-versus-BST bug that gate was written for, fixed on twenty pages and left on the twenty-first. It now reads both shapes, both const and var, and every page that carries a clock.
Romain Faivre was on the books and amortising nowhere, and it moves the ratio the wrong way CORRECTION
Faivre has been out on loan at Auxerre with no squad row on this page, so the €15m Bournemouth paid Lyon on 12 July 2023 — about £12.9m — was writing down against nothing at all. A loan never frees the amortisation; only a sale does.
It costs them, and in the season it can least afford to. The squad amortisation floor rose past the input, so in-amo goes £72m → £73m and the ratio 71.2% → 71.5% against the 70% limit that applies in Europe. The overshoot goes from about £3.4m/yr to £4.4m/yr, in their first European season.
His contract end is not published and is carried as an estimate to June 2028, flagged as one. That estimate drives the annual charge, so it is worth stating plainly rather than burying: a shorter deal would make the yearly cost higher, not lower.
Three pages had the window shutting four hours early CORRECTION
Hull, Coventry and Newcastle counted down to 7pm on 1 September. The window shuts at 11pm, which is what the other seventeen pages said and what their clocks ran to. On the eve of deadline day, three club pages were telling readers they had four hours less than they did.
Both halves were wrong together, which is why nothing looked odd on those pages: the label said 7PM and the clock counted to 19:00, so they agreed with each other and disagreed with the rest of the site. The first fix here only corrected the labels, and the new gate immediately failed for the right reason, catching a symptom fixed without its cause.
Also tidied: a squad-list deadline written as “after the window closes (~2 September)”, where the date belongs to the list and the parenthetical made it read as hedging on the window itself. And the Premier League checkpoint countdown was set to midnight UTC on 1 October, which is one o’clock in the morning here, because it was stored as though Britain were on GMT in October rather than BST.
tools/check-countdowns.js now renders each stored target through Europe/London and compares it to the label written beside it. Timezone is the whole difficulty: 22:00 UTC is 11pm in September and would not be in December, so the two can only be compared after conversion. Broken on purpose in both directions before being trusted, once with a wrong label against a right clock and once the other way about.
This was found because a reader corrected something said in conversation, not by anything that runs. Sixteen gates check this site and none of them read a clock.
The bolding was doing too much work — 2,316 signposts dropped EDITORIAL
A reader said the site reads as though a machine wrote it. That is worth measuring rather than arguing with, so it was measured.
The design came out fine. Claret and blue are the club’s own rather than the cream-and-terracotta that generated pages default to, the display face is Barlow Condensed rather than Inter, corners are three or four pixels rather than fully rounded, and there are five emoji on a 530KB page. Nothing there needed changing.
The prose was the problem, and one habit dominated: a bolded editorial sentence opening almost every paragraph. There were 2,612 of them, roughly one bold span every 62 words across half a million words of text. Bold is for things a reader scans for — a fee, a name, a date, a verdict. Used on the thesis of every paragraph it stops marking anything at all, and it is one of the most recognisable tells there is.
2,316 of those have gone. Figures, names, labels and short verdicts keep theirs. No wording changed anywhere, only tags, so nothing about the analysis moved and the whole pass reverts with one command. Density goes from one bold every 62 words to one every 85.
Two things this does not fix, stated plainly because the difference matters. The em-dash rate is 17.3 per thousand words against one to three in edited prose, and that needs a slower pass: a blanket substitution produces comma splices. And underneath both is a rhetorical habit no script reaches — signpost, then aphorism, then antithesis, three times a paragraph. That is the thing the reader actually noticed, and it has to be rewritten by hand.
One note on method: the first attempt stripped the bold from the two sentences that state the medical rule, which tools/check-deal-stage.js holds byte-identical across all twenty pages. The gate failed and the sentences are excluded now. It was written to guard a transfer convention and it caught a typography change, which is the argument for gating wording as well as arithmetic.
Agent fees to 10%, the wage gross-up to 1.55x — both were too low, and the FA publishes the proof MODEL CHANGE
Two constants underneath every figure on this site have moved, at a reader’s prompting. The agent fee charged on a signing goes from 5% of the transfer fee to 10%, and the wage gross-up from 1.45x to 1.55x. Both were estimates that had never been checked against a published source. Both now have one.
The agent rate was checkable all along. The FA publishes what every club pays intermediaries. Between 4 February 2025 and 2 February 2026, Premier League clubs paid £460.3m — against the £3,137m of incoming fees this site records for that window, an implied rate of 14.7%, nearly three times the 5% being charged. Chelsea alone paid £65.1m, Aston Villa £38.4m. 10% is the figure taken, deliberately below the implied ceiling: the FA total also covers sales, loans and contract renewals, and only the buy-side portion is capitalised into a transfer’s cost. It is a floor with evidence under it rather than a rule of thumb.
The gross-up was missing a whole category of pay. It covered employer NI, bonuses and image rights — but not signing-on fees, and UEFA is explicit that they count. Annex G.3 of the Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations: all forms of consideration to and/or benefit of players, such as sign-on fees, must be treated as employee benefit expenses and not costs of a player’s registration. So they belong in the numerator, they sit with the wage rather than the amortisation, and they spread across the contract as a prepayment for services. Employer NI alone is 15%, so of the old 45% only about 30 points were doing the work of bonuses, image rights and signing-on fees together. 55% gives that last item somewhere to live.
What actually moved. League-wide, the annual cost this window adds rises from £1,257m to £1,330m. Twelve clubs’ wage inputs were re-derived by the bridge and reset to it; no club crossed a limit, and headline ratios moved by at most 0.9 of a point — mostly downwards, which is worth understanding rather than glossing: the gross-up applies to the net wage movement, and most clubs sold more wage than they bought, so a bigger multiplier makes a negative movement more negative. Every projection built on an old baseline was recomputed too, not just the baselines.
One piece of tidying that mattered more than it looks. The gross-up existed as a named constant and then as five hard-coded copies of 1.45 in the same file, on all twenty pages. They all now read the constant. A number duplicated a hundred times across a site is not a convention, it is a hundred chances to change ninety-nine of them.
Nothing below a medical belongs in the Ins & Outs tables RULE CHANGE
No row on this page had to move — every deal in the tables here was already at a medical or announced. The rule and its gate apply the same way, and the wording on both tabs now states it.
The status ladder ran done → advanced → in talks → offer, and all four rungs were rendered as rows in the deal tables. The bottom two contributed nothing to any figure — every total on this site filters to done and advanced — which made them arithmetically harmless and editorially loud. A reader scanning the Ins table saw rows the club had never agreed to, in the same table, in the same shape, as business that is done. Being excluded from the totals is not visible; being in the table is.
The threshold is now a medical. A deal enters at advanced — terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, awaiting only an announcement — and moves to done when a club announces it. A loan row is an agreed loan. Everything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives in the Rumour Mill, where it can still be ticked and modelled against the ratio. Nothing has been deleted. A row that counted towards nothing still counts towards nothing; it is just no longer sitting where settled business sits.
Four figures did move, and they moved because they had been wrong. The headline ratios, the swing and the window balance all filter to done and advanced and were untouched. But the amortisation column added to the deal tables sums every row in the table with no filter at all, and writes its total into a footer labelled “TOTALS IN (confirmed/advanced)” — a total that named a filter it did not apply. The same total feeds the “Added by this window’s deals” and “Net change” lines under the run-off chart. So unagreed deals were being amortised into figures that said they excluded them:
- Crystal Palace — added by this window’s deals +£12.4m/yr → +£6.6m/yr, nearly halved, because Le Guen (£12m) and Njie (£16m) were being amortised though neither fee exists; freed −£18.3m/yr → −£12.3m/yr; net −£5.9m → −£5.7m/yr.
- Sunderland — added +£11.2m/yr → +£6.7m/yr and net change +£9.2m → +£4.8m/yr, on an asking price for Poku that no one had agreed to pay.
- Brentford — added +£16.9m/yr → +£16.1m/yr, net +£16.5m → +£15.6m/yr.
- Liverpool — totals out, wage ~£735k/wk → ~£725k/wk and cost freed £61m → £60.2m/yr, for a loan with no agreed destination.
The amortisation code has deliberately not been changed. Its filter is now the whole table, because the whole table is now business at a medical or beyond — and the fix belongs at the input, in one gate, rather than as a twenty-first copy of the same rule pasted into twenty pages of inline script. That is also the answer to why this survived: nothing compared a table’s footer against the label printed on it, and the rows doing the damage were invisible in every figure a reader would have checked.
Twelve rows moved across eight clubs, and the wording moved on all twenty. The ledes described the threshold nine different ways — “medical/verbal”, “option/verbal”, “talks/verbal”, “medical or negotiating” — and three of those promised a table that now excludes what they promised. One sentence states the rule on the Ins & Outs tab and its counterpart on the Rumours tab, identical on every page, and tools/check-deal-stage.js holds both to the letter as well as failing any deal row below the threshold. The gate was broken on purpose twice before being trusted: once by dropping a row’s stage entirely, which is the obvious way round a stage check, and once by adding a season array no hard-coded list would have known about.
The Ins & Outs tab scrolled sideways on a phone, and so did every other tab CORRECTION
One table on this site sat outside a scroll container. The amortisation runoff — Season, Already here, This window, Combined — is 560px wide and had nothing but a margin on its wrapper, while every other table on the page sits inside .twrap with overflow-x:auto. At phone width it stretched the whole document about 200px past the viewport, and because it was the document scrolling rather than a box inside it, every tab slid sideways, not just the one containing the table. All twenty club pages, identically.
It is not new and it was not the Read more button. The version of this page from before that change overflows by exactly the same 597 pixels against a 390-pixel viewport, which is worth stating plainly rather than letting the newest change take the blame for the oldest bug.
Why it went unseen is the more useful part. The browser check that runs against every page loaded it at desktop width and never clicked a tab, so it could not have seen either half of this: not the narrow viewport, and not the tab the table lives on. It now runs at 390px and walks all twelve tabs on all twenty pages, failing on any page whose document scrolls horizontally. That costs real time on each run, which is the honest price of catching a class of fault that only exists on the device most readers use.
The deal notes now fold away behind a button LAYOUT
The note under a player’s name is where the reasoning for a deal lives, and on the busiest rows it runs to several hundred words. Read end to end that is the point of the table; scrolled past on a phone it buries the row underneath and everything after it. Long notes now clamp to two lines with a Read more button, and short ones are left exactly as they were — a note that fits gets no furniture around it. The full text stays in the page whether or not it is open, so it is still searchable, copyable and printable.
It did not work the first time, and the reason is worth writing down. The clamp was styled on a single class, and the table already carried a td .glide-cap rule setting the notes to display as blocks — a more specific selector, so it won. The result was a button that toggled its own label and changed nothing else: the line-clamp property applied, the display property it depends on did not, and the note stayed full height. Checked in a browser at phone width rather than by reading the stylesheet, which is the only way that particular failure shows up.
A sell-on reduces the profit, not just the cash — and the gate that should have said so was reading a different page CORRECTION
Asked whether everything a transfer actually contains was applied to the deals on this site, and one thing was not. A sell-on owed to a former club is a cost of the disposal: it comes off the profit booked, not only off the cash banked. This site deducted it from the window balance and the List A test and then left it out of profit entirely — and profit is what feeds the squad-cost denominator through the three-year average. It now comes off booked profit, so the only quantified clause on the site, Villa’s £15m to Middlesbrough on the £117m Rogers fee, is handled by the model rather than by hand.
The gate was passing green on a £15m disagreement, and the reason is worth recording. The trading bridge’s check pulls the profit function out of the page and runs it — but that function reaches outside its own block for the sell-on data, which the extract did not include. Undefined dependency, guard returns zero, and the checker quietly computed a different profit from the one the page computes. A checker that does not mirror the page is not checking the page. It now pulls its dependencies across too, and it failed immediately when it did.
No figure moves today. The £15m had already been taken off this club’s denominator by hand when the sell-on was first noticed; the anchor gives that third back so the arithmetic lands in the same place, and from here it flows automatically. The three other clauses on the site — Baleba, Reijnders and Chérif — are recorded as unquantified and still contribute nothing, which is honest rather than convenient: the exposure is real and the percentage has never been reported.
Six qualifiers cap the squad at 23, and the selling model is why NEW
The Premier League’s own squad rule arrives on this page. Until today it carried UEFA’s List A and nothing about the domestic quota — a different rule with different arithmetic: 25 senior places, no more than 17 non-homegrown, under-21s outside the list altogether, and players out on loan not registered at all.
Where this squad stands: 18 of the 25 places used, 6 homegrown and 12 non-homegrown, with 5 under-21s playing free of the list. They can name 23, not 25 — the seventeen non-homegrown ceiling runs out before the places do.
Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test, which is why every player now carries a stated basis rather than a bare flag: three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which he turns 21. Nationality is not the question and repeatedly gives the wrong answer.
Why it was missing until now. The section was built for one club eleven months ago and the commit that shipped it said the other nineteen would follow. They did not, because an absent feature breaks no gate and nothing was watching for absence. Every count here derives from the squad table, and the same headcount gate that holds every other page holds this one.
The sale-profit input now derives itself, like the wage input above it METHOD
in-psp is the three-year average player-trading profit in the squad-cost denominator, and it was hand-set on all twenty pages. The failure mode is the one the wage bridge was built to stop, one input along: a sale completes, its profit is booked in the table, and the figure meant to carry a third of it stays where somebody last typed it. It only ever moved when whoever booked the deal remembered — which is the definition of a number that will eventually be wrong.
The page now shows its working beside the input: the earlier years’ contribution, plus this window’s booked profit divided by three, because UEFA smooths player-trading profit over three years so one window enters at roughly a third. Booked means done and not a loan — an advanced deal has not completed and its profit is not in the accounts, which is also the convention this page was already kept on. The profit is net of the FIFA solidarity taken out of a foreign sale.
One thing about the anchor is worth stating rather than glossing. The earlier years’ figure is carried forward from the number this page already used, not sourced from published accounts, so the bridge agrees with today’s input by construction. It earns its keep from here on, by moving when a deal lands. Tested by planting a completed sale into the tables and leaving the input alone: the gate said the denominator was £20m short, which is exactly the silence it exists to break.
A sale can lose money once FIFA has taken its 5%, and the formatter could not write it down CORRECTION
Modelling solidarity produced the site’s first negative profit on a completed sale. Villa banked ~£8.08m of Lucas Digne’s £8.5m fee against a book value of £8.5m, so that deal is a small loss rather than a break-even — which is the correct answer, and one the gross-fee basis could never produce.
The money formatter could not render it. It put the pound sign first and the minus wherever the number happened to start, so the cell read “£-0.4m” against a site that writes −£0.4m everywhere else. Nineteen pages had that version. Bournemouth had the correct one, negative-aware, written when its own trading profit went below zero — so the fix was to adopt the version already in the codebase rather than invent a twentieth. All twenty now share one formatter.
Checked in a browser rather than by inspection, because the failure this could introduce is a doubled sign where a caller already prepends its own minus: no malformed negative on any of the twenty, and no JavaScript error.
FIFA takes 5% of every fee sold abroad, and this site had been booking 100% of it CORRECTION
Asked what else is inside a completed deal that these numbers miss, and the answer was the solidarity contribution. 5% of any international transfer fee is deducted from the fee and shared among the clubs that trained the player between 12 and 23. The mechanics decide who pays: the buying club hands over the headline number and distributes the 5% out of it, so a purchase costs exactly the fee already capitalised here — nothing was wrong on that side. The selling club banks 95%. Every profit booked on a sale abroad was therefore 5% too high, across all twenty pages, from launch. Around £28m league-wide.
On this page it is £0.33m, from the foreign sales of Hamed Junior Traoré, Owen Bevan. That comes off booked profit, and a third of it off the denominator, because sale profit feeds the squad-cost ratio through a three-year average.
The glossary had been claiming this was modelled the whole time. It said the 4% Premier League levy and FIFA’s 5% solidarity contribution both capitalise into registration cost — true of the levy, true of solidarity for a buyer, and quietly untrue of the thing that actually matters, which is what a seller keeps. Documentation that describes a calculation the code does not perform is worse than no documentation, because it stops anyone looking.
It is derived, not typed. The deduction comes from where the player went, which puts all the weight on classifying a destination — and getting that wrong is silent: an English club missing from the list costs its seller 5% of a fee it actually keeps, and no total looks odd. So tools/check-solidarity.js refuses to classify by default. Every fee-carrying destination must be a club one of the two lists already knows; a name in neither fails until a human decides which it is. The gate also holds the twenty inline copies of the classifier to being identical, for the same reason the wage gross-up is a single constant.
One assumption is recorded rather than hidden: Cardiff, Newport, Swansea and Wrexham are Welsh clubs inside the English pyramid, and are treated here as domestic because their registrations run through the English system.
Also documented, deliberately not changed: add-ons are modelled all-in on a purchase and guaranteed-only on a sale. That asymmetry makes the buy column a best case and the sell column a conservative one, and it now says so on the page instead of being visible only to whoever recomputes the fees.
Wages in the deal tables were understated by 45%, and the sentence describing the fix was wrong on nine other pages CORRECTION
The site grosses wages by 1.45 to cover employer NI, bonuses and image rights — everywhere except the two columns readers actually look at. The cost of an arrival and the relief from a departure in the Incomings and Outgoings tables were built from raw weekly wages, so every one of them understated the real charge. Both columns are now grossed through a single GROSS constant, so they cannot come apart again. The headline ratio does not move: it is computed from the wage, amortisation and agent inputs, which were already on the grossed basis. What moves is the Net SCR Swing card and the two columns feeding it.
Which is where the second problem was. The swing is derived from the deal arrays and was therefore right the moment the gross-up landed — but the same figure is also typed into the overview callout, and typed figures do not move. Nothing on this page stated either figure wrongly — the gross-up moved its table columns and nothing else. Palace’s was the clearest case: it read “still negative” where the page computed a positive swing, so the sentence was not stale but inverted.
Nothing showed this in a browser. A small script copies the derived card into the overview span at load, so the screen self-healed while the file stayed wrong — the same failure as the share card that displayed correctly and shipped a stale number to anyone who read the source. tools/check-overview-figures.js now runs the page’s own formulas against the page’s own arrays and fails on any stated swing or profit that disagrees, in the callout or in prose. The changelog is excluded, because a dated entry is a record.
Two more holes closed while the gate was being written. The baseline gate knew five ways of phrasing a ratio and not the one in the most-read sentence on every page, which is how City carried “~65% ratio vs the 70% wall” against a computed 57.1%; it now reads that shape too. And tools/check-parity.js checks that CI runs every gate the local suite runs — twice a gate had been wired into one and not the other, and both times it was caught by eye rather than by anything.
Ten answer blocks disagreed with their own pages — and the rule that lets that happen is now written down CORRECTION
The answer block is the first paragraph on every club page and the one a search engine quotes. It states four things that are all derivable — the ratio, the headroom or overshoot, what the club has banked from sales, what it has committed on signings — and only the ratio had a gate. Ten of the twenty disagreed with their own data. Brighton said £91.9m banked against £156.9m of completed sales; Manchester United £89m committed against £154m; Sunderland £0m against £32.6m; Forest was wrong on all three. Every answer block is now written from the deal tables and the ratio inputs rather than typed, and a gate holds them there.
One of the ten was two days old and mine. Manchester City’s said “£338m banked from sales”, which came from reading a total that includes advanced deals into a sentence that says banked. It is £288m. Advanced business is committed, not banked, and the gate now applies that distinction rather than trusting whoever writes the sentence to remember it.
Chelsea, Fulham and Ipswich stated no headroom at all, because they are over their line and the sentence had been written for clubs that are under it. They now say by how much: −£23.3m, −£19.2m and −£17.7m per year.
And the underlying rule is now recorded in the repo rather than relied on. A club page is twelve sections plus the head, the same quantity is stated in several of them, and every significant error here has had one shape: a figure corrected where somebody noticed it and left standing everywhere else. tools/echoes.js reports which sections state a given figure before it is edited, and the gates that exist because of this rule are listed alongside it. Anything derivable gets derived; anything typed gets a gate.
No gate had ever read a headcount CORRECTION
Ten gates run on every build and not one of them counted players. They read percentages, deal statuses, transfer rows, bar widths and card images — so a sentence saying “nineteen senior players, six places unused” could sit beside a card correctly showing 22 and 3, indefinitely, with everything green.
There is now a gate that recounts from the squad table, using the page’s own registration rule rather than a second copy of it: a player is on the list unless he is loaned out or under 21 on the season’s cut-off, and the cut-off is read from the page rather than assumed. It checks the registered total, the homegrown and non-homegrown split, the free places and the under-21 count, in both digits and words.
It missed one of its own test cases on the first run. “Six more players are under 21” begins a sentence, so the word is capitalised, and a lowercase-only pattern walked straight past it — found only by planting each stale figure back and checking the build failed. Four claim types, four confirmed failures, then green. A check you have not watched fail is a guess about what it catches.
The hero stat cards were three-across on a phone, and four of them left an orphan LAYOUT
Reported on Villa: three columns on a 430px screen squeezed the longest card into a ribbon, and because that page carries four cards rather than three, the fourth dropped alone onto a second row beside two empty cells. Below 760px the grid is now two columns, which gives Villa a clean 2×2.
The other nineteen pages carry three cards, so two columns would have left an orphan there instead. A lone last card now spans the full row rather than sitting beside a hole — so three reads as two-then-one and four reads as two-and-two, without a special case for either.
Desktop had the same orphan and nobody had mentioned it. Four cards in a fixed three-column grid is unbalanced at every width, not just on a phone. The grid fits its own content now, so Villa gets four across on a wide screen and the three-card pages are unchanged. Measured at 390, 430 and 1400px rather than eyeballed.
And the card that caused it got shorter. Villa’s List A churn description had just been lengthened to fix an arrival count, which is what made it tower over its neighbour. The names moved out — they are on the Ins & Outs tab — and every figure in it stayed.
A stale ratio phrased one way slipped a gate built for another CORRECTION
The prose-baseline gate catches “roughly N% of football revenue”. It did not catch “sit at roughly N%”, which is how the glossary phrases the same claim — so a stale ratio could sit in a definition indefinitely while the identical statement in the FAQ was checked on every build. Found on Villa, where the glossary was two revisions behind the page.
Extending the rule found the same fault on three more pages nobody had asked about. Arsenal’s glossary said 64% against 66.1% computed; Fulham’s said 90% against 94.0%; Ipswich’s said the ratio “sits at roughly 85% — on the line” when it is 94.6%, about ten points over. Ipswich’s sentence also quoted a “~£106m gross window” that the deal table puts at ~£147m. That one was wrong twice and read as reassurance both times.
A gate that matches one phrasing of a claim is a gate against that phrasing, not against the claim. Both forms are checked now, and the extension was tested by planting the old figure back and confirming the build fails.
Both loan bars read as full when only one quota was used CORRECTION
Reported by a reader looking at Villa on a phone, and right. The card showed two full amber bars, so both ceilings looked hit — when the line under the second one said 6 of 6 international slots still free. Only the domestic quota was used. The bar was hard-coded to 100% and had nothing to do with the sentence beneath it.
Every one of these bars was a literal width typed in beside the text it was meant to summarise. That is the same fault as the headline reading “1 + 6 Left” above a body saying none left, which already had a gate; the bar had simply never been looked at. They are derived now — “N of M remaining” means M−N used, and the width and the colour come from that, so the picture and the sentence cannot disagree. Amber only when nothing is left, which is the point at which a quota starts deciding what a club can do.
Writing the check found four more pages the report had not mentioned. Fulham, Ipswich, Tottenham and Coventry each had a quota line with no bar above it at all, so the international ceiling was invisible on those cards. And Chelsea’s international bar sat at 33% beside a sentence that stated no count whatsoever — nothing could have derived it and nobody could have checked it. That line now says 5 of 6 senior slots remaining and shows its working: Badiashile at Napoli is the one senior non-club-trained loan abroad, with Antwi and Murray-Campbell treated as academy and therefore exempt. Disagree with that classification if you like — the point is that it is now possible to.
The gate checks the source, not just the screen. Villa’s rendered card was fixed by the derivation the moment it was added, while the hard-coded 100% was still sitting in the file — correct in the browser, wrong in the thing a checker reads and the thing that renders before any script runs. Both are right now, and the gate compares the typed width against the stated numbers so a hand edit cannot quietly reintroduce it.
Deep audit of the rules and the inputs: the wage figure had drifted from its own derivation on five clubs CORRECTION
The rule constants are unanimous across all twenty pages and all correct — the £105m PSR cap, the €60m earnings limit, the five-year amortisation cap and its 1 July 2023 start, the 4% Premier League levy, the 1 January 2005 under-21 cut-off, 17 non-homegrown of 25, two concurrent domestic loans and six international. Thirty-nine separate statements of the five-year cap; not one disagreed with another. That is the half of this audit with nothing to report, and it is worth reporting that it has nothing to report.
Every club’s cap now agrees with its European status. In Europe the UEFA line is 70%, outside it the Premier League’s is 85% — fifteen points of headroom turning on a single yes/no, asserted in three places at once and checked in none. All twenty agree: nine in Europe at 70%, eleven outside at 85%. A gate now enforces it, because a club’s European status is exactly what changes between seasons.
The real finding is the wage input. This site’s stated convention is that the wage figure IS the wage bridge’s own derivation on every accounts-basis club — that is what makes the league table comparable, and what makes the input track the window instead of sitting at a pre-window figure nobody updates. It had decayed on five clubs, because deals get booked by hand and the input gets nudged by hand with them, and a nudge drifts from the derivation the moment the arithmetic differs by a rounding. Tottenham were £22m adrift. All five are now set to the derivation and a gate holds them there. Promoted clubs are correctly exempt and the bridge explains why in its own text: a wage bill roughly doubles on going up, so last season’s accounts are the wrong anchor in both directions at once.
One club changes compliance status as a result. Bournemouth go from 69.8% to 71.2% — from just inside the 70% cap to about £3.4m/yr over it, in their first European season, on the tighter cap that European qualification brings. Tottenham move 64.6% to 68.3%, Forest 81.9% to 82.7%, Manchester City 57.7% to 57.1%, Villa 64.0% to 63.8%.
And two more pages were flooring their headroom at zero. Ipswich read “£0m of room” while sitting £17.8m/yr over the 85% line; Bournemouth would have done the same on crossing it. The same defect was fixed on Palace four days ago and not looked for elsewhere — which is the lesson, not the bug. Both now state the overshoot.
What the audit could not do. Every football site and reference database is blocked from this environment, so the transfer tables were reconciled internally — squad rows against deal rows, amortisation floors against inputs, both sides of every intra-league move — and checked externally only as far as search summaries allow. Internally they reconcile on all twenty clubs. That is a real guarantee about consistency and not a guarantee about completeness, and the £50m signing found missing yesterday is what the difference looks like.
The share card is now checked like everything else — and two gates had never run in CI at all CORRECTION
Rebuilding the cards fixed today’s figures and fixed nothing about tomorrow’s. A generator someone has to remember to run is exactly what produced a card reading 60.2% four days out of date, so the question is not whether the cards are right now but whether they can go wrong again quietly. A gate now recomputes the card’s figures from the page and compares them against the token the builder stamped into the meta tag. Move any input — a wage, a fee, a sale — and the build fails until the card is rebuilt. It was tested by nudging Villa’s wage input and confirming the failure, and by stripping the token to confirm that fails too.
The builder and the gate read the figures through one shared module. Two copies of the same calculation drifting apart is the failure this site has hit more than any other, and it would be absurd to reintroduce it in the check designed to prevent it.
And checking the CI list against the local one turned up a real gap. Two gates — the one that catches stale ratio figures in prose, and the loan-quota headline check — existed, worked, and had never run in CI. They only ran when someone ran the full suite by hand, which means a direct push could have deployed stale numbers with a green tick. Both now run on every push, and the two lists are asserted to match. The prose-baseline gate is the one that has caught the most this week, and it was the one running least often.
The share cards were showing a ratio four days and six deals out of date CORRECTION
The squad cost ratio is printed into the card image itself, which is fine until the ratio moves. Villa’s card said 60.2% against a page saying 64.0% — the figure from before the Goretzka wage correction, and before Jackson, Martínez, Suzuki, Ruggeri and the rest. Anyone sharing the link was posting a number this site had stopped believing on 27 August. Chelsea’s said 83% against 88.7%; Manchester City’s said ~65% against 57.7%.
There was no generator. The cards were made once, by hand, on 26 August and left, so nothing could have kept them current. There is one now: tools/build-og-cards.js reads every figure from the page it belongs to and rebuilds all twenty, and it runs like any other build step.
Cache-busting is the part that actually matters for sharing. X and Facebook cache a card image against its URL for days, so replacing the file in place does nothing for a link anyone has already posted. Each card’s meta tag now carries a version token derived from the figures on it, so the URL changes exactly when the picture changes and not otherwise.
The number is now coloured the way the page colours it — green three points clear of the limit, amber up to it, red past it. A card showing Ipswich at 94.6% against an 85% line in the same neutral cream as one showing Manchester United at 56.9% throws away the only thing a reader takes from a shared image.
And a gate now checks the alt text against the computed ratio, because that was stale too and in a way nobody would ever notice: six pages carried figures in the card’s alt attribute that no longer matched, including one that had never matched any published base. It was tested by planting the old 60.2% and confirming the build fails.
Full pre-deadline audit of all 20 clubs — one £50m transfer was missing entirely SWEEP
Nico González, Manchester City to Newcastle, ~£50m, completed and announced. Medical taken, presented to supporters before the West Brom cup tie, No.6 shirt issued — and absent from both pages. It is the largest single omission this site has had to correct, and it moved two ratios materially: City 60.4% → 57.7% with headroom out to £100.2m, Newcastle 70.8% → 74.7% with headroom down to £46.8m against their 85% line. The fee is reported as reaching £50m after add-ons, so the guaranteed portion is lower and unpublished; £50m is carried on both sides because a counterpart has to agree, and it is flagged. The same number cannot be conservative for both clubs at once — it flatters City’s profit while overstating Newcastle’s charge — and that is stated rather than smoothed over.
Everything else checked out, which is the more useful result. Forty-odd names drawn from external reporting were tested against the pages one by one and every single one was already there. Where the reporting and this site disagreed, this site was right: one summary placed Detourbet, Monga and Rulli at Nottingham Forest when all three are Manchester City signings, and another had Bouaddi at Forest when City announced him.
Two numeric errors found by audit rather than by reading. Manchester City’s Kalvin Phillips loan credited £11.3m of relief when a loan frees the wage and none of the amortisation — the registration stays, and so does the charge. Corrected to £7.8m. Nottingham Forest’s Gustavo Sá loan freed nothing at all when Olympiacos pay his wages; corrected to £1.8m. Two more outgoing loans, at Leeds and Liverpool, carried no loan flag, so the amortisation book and the List A gate were treating them as permanent sales.
Eight new checks, and they were run against real data before being trusted. A completed permanent signing must have a squad row; a sold player must not still be in one; a destination reading “loan” must carry a loan flag; no duplicate squad rows; no fee without contract dates; no end date before the signing date; no signing dated in the future; no expired contract still in the squad. All eight are clean across all twenty clubs, and two were deliberately broken to confirm they fail. Three earlier checks this week passed on their first run because they were wrong, not because the data was right, so nothing goes in now without being made to fail first.
What this sweep cannot claim. Every football site, news aggregator and reference database is blocked from this environment, so external checking is search summaries only — and those summaries mixed up clubs twice in this pass alone. The internal consistency of these pages is now verified exhaustively and mechanically. Their completeness against the real world is verified as far as search allows, which is not the same thing, and the González miss is what that gap looks like.
The stale-rumour gate could only see half the market — two more boards were selling players who had left CORRECTION
Yesterday’s gate checked live rumours against completed incomings at other clubs. That catches a player who moved between Premier League clubs and nothing else. Two whole classes of exit were invisible to it, and both had live cards sitting on boards.
A player sold abroad appears in no incoming table anywhere. Spurs sold Cristian Romero to Atlético Madrid and announced it on 15 August; Arsenal’s board went on offering him to the scenario modeller for a fortnight. The gate now reads completed outgoing rows as well, taking the destination from the row itself — which is derivable, and should have been there first time.
And a move between two non-Premier-League clubs is recorded on no page at all. Bayern sold João Palhinha to Benfica on 26 August — €14m plus up to €5m, contract to 2030 — and Newcastle’s card still read “door ajar again”. Nothing structural could ever have caught that, so there is now a small list at tools/gone.json for exactly this case, and the gate fails against it. Two names so far: Palhinha, and Leão to Galatasaray.
One false positive, worth recording because it nearly shipped. The first version read Jadon Sancho’s outgoing row — destination “Free agent” — as him having joined a club called Free agent, and would have killed two perfectly live cards. A released player has left a club and joined nobody: he is more signable, not less. Release destinations are now excluded, while a row naming an onward club after an arrow still counts. All three arms were then tested by un-flagging a closed card and checking the gate fired, because a check nobody has seen fail is not yet a check.
Cards closed: Romero (Arsenal), Palhinha (Newcastle), Cho (Hull, where Hull themselves ended the talks on 10 August). Each keeps its note as the record and leaves the modeller.
Dead rumours were still tickable — three players could be “signed” on boards they had already left CORRECTION
The scenario modeller priced any card you ticked, including cards whose own tag said the player was gone. Newcastle’s board offered Nicolas Jackson after he had joined Villa; the tag read “DEAD — JOINED ASTON VILLA” and ticking it still moved the ratio. Liverpool’s offered Ezri Konsa, an Arsenal player since 20 August. Chelsea’s offered Ousmane Diomande, who is at Forest. This site has named that exact contradiction in its own changelog — “a completed deal and a live rumour for the same player” — and then kept shipping it, because nothing was looking for it.
Now something looks. A gate fails any live incoming rumour naming a player who has completed a move to another club, which is derivable from the transfer tables rather than from a tag somebody remembered to type. Only incoming cards are checked: an outgoing rumour naming a player another club has signed is the same move seen from the selling side, and that is correct. It found all three on its first run.
Dead cards now stay on the board and leave the model. They keep their note as the record of what a club looked at, greyed, with the tick removed and the impact line replaced by “no longer available”. Deleting them would lose the history; leaving them live was worse.
Deadline-week sweep: four announced deals the tables had missed, and a gate that was crying wolf SWEEP
Four deals were sitting at “advanced” after their clubs had announced them. Bouaddi to Manchester City — announced on the club’s own site on 26 August, and carried here as unannounced for four days, with the prose quoting “~£95m/€110m… agreed in principle” when the real deal is £81.3m fixed plus £4.3m of add-ons on a contract to 2031. Badiashile to Napoli, announced 22 August. Disasi to Crystal Palace, announced 26 August by both clubs. And Emi Martínez to Chelsea, announced by Villa on 30 August. All four are now booked, with the ratios on five pages moving as a result.
The Disasi loan is the one with a consequence nobody was watching. Palace were sitting a whisker inside the 70% cap that their European qualification imposes. Taking a £120k/wk centre-back on loan added ~£9.0m/yr of grossed wages and put them over it — a loan, with no fee, no amortisation and no transfer to report, moving a compliance position that a £30m signing would have been scrutinised for. This page has argued all summer that loans are treated as free when they are not; this is the arithmetic saying it.
And the prose-baseline gate was flagging a correct sentence. It reads any “roughly N% of football revenue” as a claim about the club’s own ratio — but “capped at roughly 70% of football revenue” describes the LIMIT, and Palace’s page says exactly that, twice. A gate that fails on correct text is worse than one that stays quiet, because the next person learns to skim past it. It now ignores the phrase when cap or limit wording precedes it, and it still fails on a genuinely stale figure — checked by planting one before shipping.
The league window table was wrong on 19 of its 20 rows — and an edit ate two deal rows without a single gate noticing CORRECTION
The “Who’s Selling to Survive” table is a derivation and had stopped being one. Its own caption defines it exactly — disclosed fees on officially completed 2026 deals, loans and frees excluded — so every figure in it can be recomputed from the transfer tables it summarises. Nineteen of the twenty rows disagreed with those tables. Six clubs were shown as having spent nothing at all, including Newcastle at £0 against £174.9m of completed incomings and Manchester City at £0 of sales against £238m. The rows were hand-maintained, the pages moved on, and nothing compared the two. All twenty are now derived from the pages, with the hand-written notes kept, and a gate recomputes them so the table cannot drift from the deals again.
The second fault is worse, because it was self-inflicted and invisible. Promoting Jackson spliced his row out of one array and into another by matching the next }, — and deal rows share source lines, so the edit swallowed whatever followed on the same line. Goretzka’s incoming row vanished from Villa and Kellyman’s outgoing row from Chelsea. All eight gates passed. A missing row breaks no parse, satisfies every invariant, and simply makes the totals smaller — and nothing on the page knew what they should have been.
Two things now catch it. A squad player signed inside the window must also appear in the incoming table, which is a real structural invariant: the squad row survives when the deal row dies, so it is the witness. That check found a third case immediately, one nobody had touched today — Forest’s Gustavo Sá has had a squad row since July, with a book value and an amortisation charge, and his incoming row was never written. A changelog entry from that sweep claims he was added “both halves of him”. One half was missing. And for outgoing rows, which leave no trace on the page once the player has gone, there is now tools/diff-rows.js: it reports every deal row added or removed against a git ref, to be read before committing rather than after.
A free transfer was costing the window totals nothing at all — £35.7m/yr across six pages CORRECTION
The cost-per-arrival calculation returned zero for any signing without a fee unless the row also carried a loan flag. So a free signing’s wages vanished from “cost added by this window” entirely. Goretzka was showing as costing Villa £0.0m. On the very page whose card argues that “the free one is the expensive one — a fee buys an asset that amortises and can be sold, a wage buys nothing and recurs”. The card was right and the arithmetic underneath it dropped the wage.
£35.7m/yr was missing across six pages: Villa £13.6m (Goretzka, Özcan, Guessand), Palace £8.1m (McNeil, Guessand), Liverpool £7.8m (Araújo), Everton £4.9m (Johnson), Coventry £1.1m, Fulham £0.2m. Villa’s window swing moves from +£12.4m/yr to +£26.0m/yr.
There were seven different versions of that one line across twenty pages, each special-casing frees and loans slightly differently, and the differences were exactly what caused this. They are now one formula — the one Hull already used: amortisation and the agent fee when there is a fee, and the wage on every arrival, fee or not.
And it exposes something this card cannot fix by itself. The List A gate carried a hand-typed margin of “Villa pass by ~£3.5m/yr” on the cost-based test. The page’s own sums now put the window at adding ~£26m/yr. That figure predates Jackson and Watkins, and the window totals count wages ungrossed while the ratio grosses them, so the two were never on one basis. The cost-based margin is now marked UNVERIFIED rather than passing — the fee-based balance above it is sound, that one is not, and saying so beats printing a number that cannot be reproduced.
A headline that contradicted its own paragraph — and nine more stale ratios behind it CORRECTION
Villa’s loan-quota card said “1 + 6 Left” in green, directly above a paragraph reading “0 of 2 concurrent remaining” and “ROOM: none left domestically”. Wan-Bissaka’s loan on 18 August took the second slot. The body was updated; the big number at the top was not. So the figure a reader sees first said a slot was free while the text underneath called the same thing a binding constraint. The bar sat at 50% with nothing left, and the card was still green. Crystal Palace had the same shape — “2 + 6” above “1 of 2”, left over from before the Guessand loan.
The failure runs one way every time: the prose gets edited and the summary above it does not. tools/check-quotas.js now fails when a loan-quota headline disagrees with its own body, including when the room note says “none left” and the headline disagrees. Verified by sabotage — put the wrong number back and it fails on exactly that.
Then the baseline gate was widened and found nine more. It was matching “ratio is X%” and “X% → Y%” but not the Quick Answers phrasing, “roughly 63% of football revenue” — which is the plain-English answer a reader or a search engine is most likely to lift. Brentford were claiming 75% while computing 84.9%. Manchester City 65% against 57.3%. Newcastle 74% against 70.8%. Ten pages rebased from their own inputs.
Two gates, two days, and both found more than the bug that prompted them. That is the argument for writing the check rather than the fix: the fix closes one hole, the check tells you how many others there were.
The baseline gate had a hole in it and was passing on what it could not see CORRECTION
The gate shipped this morning excluded the changelog by truncating each page at <section id="log">. The data arrays holding every rumour card sit in a script block after that point. So it was scanning 167KB of a 422KB page, never saw a single card’s projection, and reported green.
It now removes only that section and keeps the rest. On the first honest run it immediately found eleven stale figures across three pages — every Villa projection still quoting a baseline two changes old, and two on Chelsea. All recomputed.
A gate with a hole in it is worse than no gate, because no gate makes you check and a green one stops you looking. This one was written, tested against the case that prompted it, and shipped — and the case that prompted it happened to sit in the part of the file it could still see.
One rule came out of it. A live rumour card may state a projection, because the gate now keeps it honest against the current base. A completed deal may not: “60.2% → 63.4%” was true the day it was written and decays the moment anything else moves, and the effect is already in the headline. Those now state what the deal costs instead.
A new gate: does the prose still quote the ratio the page computes? CORRECTION
Twelve of the twenty pages were asserting a squad cost ratio their own inputs no longer produced. Manchester City claimed 63.0% while computing 57.3%. Manchester United said 53.9% against 56.9%, Sunderland 60.9% against 63.2%, Coventry 69.7% against 71.0%. Every one has been rebased from the page’s own figures.
Most of it sat in the answer paragraph and its structured-data twin — the text search engines and AI crawlers read before anything else, which makes it the worst place on the page to be stale. The headroom figures beside them were rebased too.
Nothing was catching this. The status gate reads deal status; the invariants gate reads the arrays; neither reads a percentage in a sentence. It surfaced only because a single free transfer moved one club’s baseline and the knock-on was visible. tools/check-baselines.js now recomputes every page’s ratio from its inputs and fails on prose asserting a different one, and it runs with the rest on every change.
Two things it deliberately does not flag. A sentence reading “68.6% → 62.0%” where 62.0% is the current ratio is a completed move being described, not a stale claim, so a done deal can still say what it did. And the changelog is excluded entirely: a dated entry recording August’s number is the record, and rewriting it to match today would be the opposite of what this tab is for.
The amortisation graph now splits the squad you had from the squad you bought FEATURE
One bar was hiding the more interesting number. The run-off now stacks two series — the squad that was already here in blue, and everyone signed this window in amber — with both totals and a combined figure above it, and a per-season split beside each bar.
It changes what the chart says about a club. A settled squad shows a thin amber band on a thick blue one; a rebuild inverts it. Coventry carry £14.0m already here against £28.9m signed this window, so two-thirds of their amortisation arrived in ten weeks, and their inherited book runs out entirely by 2028/29 while the new one still has three years to run. Liverpool are the other extreme at £143.6m against £18.4m. Same chart, opposite stories, and neither was visible when it was one bar.
Who counts as “this window” is taken from the signing date, not from the flag the squad rows carry. The two disagree: the date catches six players the flag had missed — Garnacho and Cissé here at Villa, Bentley at Coventry, Charles at Fulham, Sá and Diomande at Forest — and never disagrees the other way. A derived test cannot be forgotten the way a hand-set one can, which is the same reasoning that put the sell-ons and the outgoing amortisation on derivations.
Two rows of figures now sit above the chart and they will not always agree, so the panel says which is which rather than leaving a reader to spot it. The first row and the graph are the SQUAD, split by arrival date. The second row is the DEALS, including advanced ones whose players are not in the squad table yet. Where they differ the panel names the gap and what it is — agreed business that has not completed.
Every deal now shows what it costs per year — and the agent fee was being charged five times over FEATURE + FIX
A fee only means something against the charge it creates. £47.5m is a headline; £9.9m a year for five years is the thing that reaches the squad cost ratio. Until now this page printed the fee on every row and the amortisation on none of them. Both tables now carry an AMORT £m/yr column, and a panel underneath gives the number those rows add up into: the squad’s total annual amortisation, what this window has added and freed, and how the charge runs off over the next five seasons as existing deals finish.
None of it is newly typed data, which is the point. Incoming charges come from the player’s own squad row where one exists — real contract dates, five-year cap applied where it bites — and from fee over five years where a deal is advanced and the player is not in the squad yet, flagged est when that happens. Outgoing charges are derived rather than stored: a row’s cost-freed figure is the ungrossed wage plus the amortisation, so subtracting the wage leaves the charge that stops. They cannot drift from the totals above them because they are computed from them.
Loans show a zero, and that is the correct answer rather than a missing one. A loan moves the wage and leaves the registration here, so the amortisation stays too — the point this site has made about loans since the wage bridge, now visible as a column entry instead of a paragraph.
And a bug the new column sat straight on top of. The cost-per-year calculation behind these tables charged the agent fee in full every single year instead of capitalising it and spreading it over five — the same error corrected in the scenario modeller last week and missed here. On a £47.5m signing it overstated the annual cost by £1.9m. Every SCR-cost figure in the Ins and Outs tables, and the window’s cost-added total, move down accordingly.
One thing the new column makes visible and this page is not hiding: the SCR cost figures in these tables count wages at face value, while the rumour cards, the scenario panel and the wage bridge gross them up 1.45x for employer NI, bonuses and image rights. The same signing can therefore read £17.1m in the table and £20.2m on its card. The grossed figure is this site’s convention and the table is the odd one out. It is stated in the panel rather than quietly reconciled, because restating it moves every published window total on all twenty pages and deserves its own pass.
Di Gregorio in on loan — and the Petrović charge does not go away DONE
Announced 25 August. Italy goalkeeper Michele Di Gregorio joins on a season loan from Juventus, reported at ~€1.3m (~£1.1m). A loan fee is not a transfer fee: nothing is capitalised and no amortisation starts, so the cost this season is the wage plus the loan fee expensed as incurred. The wage is this tracker’s estimate.
The squad question is bigger than the accounting one. Bournemouth already carry Đorđe Petrović at a £25m 2025 fee amortising ~£5m/yr to 2030. Signing a second senior keeper does not remove that charge — it adds a wage on top of it, at a club sitting at 69.8% against a 70% limit.
Separately, Junior Kroupi is reported to have drawn enquiries from Liverpool, Manchester United and Arsenal, despite being out with a foot injury. No bid is recorded here.
The “last updated” notice is gone — it had stopped telling the truth REMOVED
There were two of them. A line under the header reading “DEALS & FEES AS REPORTED [date] · BOOK VALUES & CALCS RECOMPUTE DAILY”, and a script that read that date and, once it was four days old, pushed an amber banner above the header warning that the page had last been checked N days ago.
The second one was firing on all twenty pages. The date it keyed off was hand-typed and ranged from 9 to 19 August across the site — while the deals underneath had in fact been swept on the 24th and 25th. So the site was leading with a warning about itself, generated from the one number on the page that nobody was maintaining. A staleness notice that is itself stale is worse than none: it tells readers to distrust figures that are current.
Both are removed, with their CSS. Nothing else changes — every ratio, book value and window total is unaffected, and the dated entries in this changelog remain the honest record of when each page was actually worked on.
You can now change the numbers — and the card line beside them was still wrong FEATURE + FIX
Every fee on the rumour board is somebody’s estimate. Brugge “value him around €45m”. Al-Hilal’s bid reached this site in the wrong currency and had to be chased down. Marmoush’s fee is arithmetic off a reported two-player budget rather than a figure anyone published. Readers were being asked to take those guesses as given.
So the amounts are editable now. Every card carries a fee box, and incoming cards a wage box too. Type your own number and the card’s cost line and the scenario panel both follow it immediately. Reset puts the reported figure back — overrides are held separately and the underlying data is never overwritten, so there is always something true to return to. Outgoing cards expose the fee but not the wage, because an outgoing player’s relief is derived from his squad row rather than typed, and the fee is the part that actually moves the profit on the sale.
And a fix that should have landed with the modeller rebuild. The card’s own “ADDS £Xm/yr” line was still running the OLD formula — ungrossed wages, and the agent fee charged in full every year. The calculation underneath was corrected; the display beside it was not, so every card showed one number while the panel below computed another. On this site’s own worked example the card said £10.1m and the panel used £10.7m — the exact discrepancy that rebuild was written to explain, sitting in the markup the whole time. Both now call the same helper, and that is checked on all twenty pages: tick a card, and its figure and the panel’s agree.
The scenario modeller is rebuilt on the site-wide conventions METHOD
The scenario modeller was wrong in three ways at once, on every page on this site. An incoming signing's wage was charged with no gross-up, while the wage bridge, the ratio inputs and every note here gross wages by 1.45x for employer NI and image rights — so every modelled signing was 45% cheaper on the wage line than the same player would be in the ratio directly above it. The agent fee was charged in full every year instead of being capitalised with the fee and amortised, so a £60m signing carried £3m/yr of agent cost rather than £0.6m. And sale profit never reached the denominator: nineteen pages let a sale relieve the numerator and stop, when the profit also lands in the denominator through the three-year average, and the twentieth added the whole window's profit when one window belongs at roughly a third.
Why none of it showed up. The first two faults pull in opposite directions and roughly cancel at a typical fee-to-wage ratio — for a £25m signing on £70k/wk the old code gave £10.09m/yr against a true £10.73m, close enough to look right. They do not cancel at the edges: a free transfer on big wages was understated by 45%, a big fee on modest wages overstated by about 9%. Two errors that hide each other are worse than one that does not.
Outgoing relief is now derived, not typed. The hand-set relief on all eighty outgoing rumour cards carried the same ungrossed wage — checked against the squad, the stated figures reproduced the ungrossed derivation almost exactly. Relief and profit now come from the squad row, on the same gross-up and the same five-year cap as everything else, with the typed figure kept as a fallback for the handful of names with no squad row. Profit is allowed to be negative, because some of these sales are losses and the page should say so.
Two method changes: the five-year cap, and the wage input becomes the derivation METHOD
The ratio moves from 66.0% to 69.8% (wages 110→121).
The five-year cap, finally applied. This site's glossary has always described the rule that fees must be amortised over a maximum of five years however long the contract — and the code did not do it, spreading every fee across the whole contract instead. An eight-year deal was therefore charged at five-eighths of its true annual cost. The cap now applies to contracts signed from 1 July 2023, when it took effect; earlier deals are left alone, which correctly grandfathers the January 2023 contracts that prompted the rule and avoids capping long spans that are really a record of extensions rather than of one contract.
And the wage input is now the derivation. The wage bridge has been showing a derived figure beside a hand-set input since it was built, and on most pages the two disagreed. The hand-set number was anchored to a pre-window figure and never tracked the window, which is why the inputs sat high at clubs that sold heavily and low at clubs that bought. The input is now the derivation on all fourteen accounts-basis clubs, so it updates itself as deals land and the same method produces every club's number. That is what makes the league table comparable, which was the point of building the bridge.
What has not changed is how good the number is. It still rests on two assumptions — 80% of staff cost being players and coaches, and a 1.45x gross-up — and the bridge still shows both. Agreement between input and derivation means they are consistent, not that they are right.
Correcting a sale-profit input I moved too far CORRECTION
The Ünal departure books a ~£7m loss against unamortised book value, and earlier today the sale-profit input was reduced by the whole of it. That input is a three-year average under UEFA's smoothing, so one window's loss belongs in it at roughly a third. Corrected from £88m back to £93m — the loss is real, but it was being counted three times over.
Ünal completed — and it books a loss, not a profit SWEEP
Enes Ünal to Getafe, announced 13 August. Held here at TALKS. It completed as a free transfer, with up to £1.3m of performance add-ons and a 20% sell-on retained.
The unusual part. Almost every outgoing on this site books a profit, because book values are low and fees are not. This one does the opposite: £14m from Getafe in 2024 on a four-year deal leaves roughly £7m of unamortised book value, and nothing came in against it. That is a £7m impairment, and player-sale profit has been reduced accordingly. The gain is ~£7.3m/yr of wage and amortisation relief; the add-ons and sell-on are contingent and are not counted.
Also added: Archie Harris to Wigan on 6 August, permanent, fee undisclosed. Academy graduate, so book value is £0 and whatever was received is pure profit this page cannot see — the same shape as the Fredricson exit on the Manchester United page.
The Kroupi queue grows — and the club keeps saying no STANCE, NOT A DEAL
Eli Junior Kroupi. Chelsea have joined Arsenal in the race, with Barcelona and Manchester City also credited — and Bournemouth’s position is unchanged: NOT FOR SALE. No card is added because there is no fee, no bid and no process, just a queue forming outside a closed door; the stance is the story, and late-window stances get tested. Everything else re-checked 15 Aug with no material changes.
Sunday sweep: everything re-verified, nothing moved — the quiet weekend before the final month 0 stage changes
Full re-check, 8–9 August. Every live thread on this page was re-verified against the weekend's reporting, and for the first time since launch nothing changed stage: no deal completed, none collapsed, nothing promoted or demoted on the done/advanced/talks ladder. Alex Scott: Chelsea's improved offer of ~£70m is still being prepared and has not been formally submitted — the rejected £64m bid and the ~£80m ask stand exactly as the 5 August entry left them, with Scott's own preference reported to lean toward Stamford Bridge. Tyler Adams: still interest without a bid, but the numbers have hardened — 6–7 August reporting puts Bournemouth's ask at ~£50m (the top of the £45–50m range previously carried) and has Adams open to the move; United remain undecided, so the rumour stays modelled at £40m and counts in nothing. Enes Ünal → Getafe: unmoved at IN TALKS — the player's agreement holds but the clubs spent the weekend still negotiating fee and structure, so it continues to count in no total. Kluivert–Juventus: monitoring only, no bid. Lucumí, Tiago Gabriel, Leweling: silent. Kroupi: stays, injured, not for sale — unchanged.
Consequently, no figure on this page moved. The amortisation input remains derived from the unchanged squad array (~£73m), SCR wages stay at the £114m set when Juanlu completed, the 3-yr smoothed sale-profit average stays at £95m (no completed sale to change it), the window balance stays at −£45.7m and the estimated squad cost ratio holds at ~67% vs the 70% wall with ~£8m/yr (~£40m of fees) of headroom. Date stamps updated to 9 August. With the league season kicking off 22 August and the window closing 1 September, the board is set: one prepared Chelsea bid, one undecided United approach and one half-agreed Getafe exit are the three threads most likely to move it.
Juanlu is official — the window's third signing lands, and Ünal wants Getafe 1 deal completed · 1 exit in talks
Juanlu Sánchez: advanced → DONE. Bournemouth and Sevilla both confirmed the deal on Thursday 6 August, two days after the medical this page logged on 5 August. Two details moved on announcement: the initial fee firmed up at £9.4m (not the ~£9.5m carried pre-announcement) with £1.7m of add-ons (~£11.1m all-in), and the contract is five years, not the reported four. He graduates from the Rumour-adjacent "medical done" rung into the Ins table as the window's third completed signing, joins the squad table (signed 6 Aug 2026, contract to 2031, est £45k/wk) and moves from "in contention" to a certainty in the List A defender group — which now has seven names, none of them homegrown.
What that does to the hero figures — all three rules observed. (1) The amortisation input is derived, not typed: adding Juanlu to the squad array moves the squad-contract total from ~£71m to ~£73m at page load (£9.4m over 4.9 years ≈ £1.9m/yr) — the in-amo field was not hand-edited. (2) Wages: per the stated convention (completed ins/outs only), his est £45k/wk adds ~£2.3m/yr, so the SCR wages input moves 112 → £114m. (3) The 3-yr smoothed sale-profit average is untouched at £95m — no completed sale since the last update changes the three-year picture. Net effect: estimated squad cost ratio ~65.9% → ~67.3% vs the 70% wall, and headroom tightens from ~£12m/yr (~£60m of fees) to ~£8m/yr (~£40m of fees). Window balance restated −£45.8m → −£45.7m on the firmed-up fee. Every callout, FAQ, glossary line and the JSON-LD quoting 66%/£12m/£60m has been moved to 67%/£8m/£40m.
New: Enes Ünal → Getafe, IN TALKS. Spanish reporting on 5–6 August (AS via FútbolFantasy, fichajes.net) has the striker agreeing personal terms on a return to Getafe, with Sevilla and Real Oviedo interest also reported — but the clubs have not agreed: fee and structure (loan vs permanent) are still being negotiated, and Bournemouth's outstanding instalments on his £13m 2024 fee may be offset in any deal. Filed in the Outs table at TALKS — it counts in no total until it completes. His A-list chip flips from "reported La Liga interest" to Getafe talks; a completed exit would free ~£6.1m/yr of squad cost and ease a List A squeeze that now has ~24 candidates for ~21–22 places.
Checked, unchanged, and deliberately not moved. Alex Scott: Chelsea's improved ~£70m offer is still being prepared per reporting through 7 August — no second bid lodged, so the rumour stays exactly where the 5 August entry put it (£64m rejected, ~£80m ask). Tyler Adams: Manchester United still "considering" a ~£35m bid per 7 August reporting — interest, no bid; unchanged. Kluivert–Juventus: still monitoring, no bid (the "Kluivert knee surgery" stories surfacing in searches are his January 2026 operation — he returned in May; not current news). Kroupi: reporting continues to confirm he stays — the injury has cooled the bidding and the club line holds; Arsenal/Chelsea/Barcelona "race" pieces predate or ignore the fracture. Lucumí, Tiago Gabriel and Leweling: no movement. No new signing found toward the No.6/No.10/winger shortlist. Nothing else completed, collapsed or credibly emerged 5–8 August.
A £24.7m striker was missing, Kroupi is out for months, and Chelsea have bid for Scott 1 signing restored · 1 rumour killed
The correction that matters. Rayan — signed from Vasco da Gama on 27 January 2026 for £24.7m plus up to £5.6m, a five-and-a-half-year deal to June 2031 — was absent from this page entirely: not in the 2025/26 ins table, not in the squad, not in the List A projection. He was the Semenyo replacement, bought days after the £62.5m Manchester City sale, At £24.7m he is one of the five biggest fees the club has ever paid. He is now in all three. Because the headroom model derives its amortisation from the squad contracts, restoring him moves that input from ~£67m to ~£71m on its own — the estimated squad cost ratio goes to ~65.9% and squad book value rises ~£229m → ~£251m. Note this is a 2025/26 signing, filed in the 2025/26 table, not presented as current window business. 2025/26 spend restated ~£150m → ~£175m.
Kroupi: the rumour is dead, and so is the price. Eli Junior Kroupi fractured a metatarsal in training on the club's Austria pre-season camp in late July, flew home and had surgery — out an estimated three to four months, missing the start of the first European campaign. Reporting since has him staying, with the club repeating that he was not for sale at any figure regardless of the injury. The £80m Kroupi exit rumour has therefore been removed from the Rumour Mill, and his squad market value is repriced from ~£70m (which was set on the reported bidding) to an estimated ~£60m. He remains registrable on List A — an injured player still occupies a squad place.
Alex Scott escalates from enquiry to bid. The page carried this as an Arsenal enquiry knocked back with United unwilling to pass ~£40m. It has moved: Chelsea have had a reported £64m bid rejected and are readying a second offer starting around £70m against a Bournemouth valuation now put at ~£80m. The rumour's modelled fee moves £70m → £80m (~£70m of book profit) and the club list becomes Chelsea / Arsenal / Man Utd. New rumour added: Tyler Adams → Manchester United, who want a specialist No.6 and have a ~£35m figure in mind against a Bournemouth ask of £45–50m; no bid lodged, modelled at £40m purely as a scenario. Both are cross-club items — the Chelsea, Arsenal and Man Utd pages should carry the same bids.
Juanlu moves up a rung within 'advanced'. He said goodbye at Sevilla, flew to England and completed his medical; reporting today has the announcement expected within days with only paperwork outstanding. Fee refined to £9.5m + £1.7m (€11m + €2m, €13m all-in) per Sky. He stays at ADVANCED, not done — there is still no announcement on afcb.co.uk, and this page does not promote a deal on a medical alone. He is deliberately still absent from the squad table, so he is not yet moving the amortisation figure. The refined fee nudges the window net balance −£45.7m → −£45.8m.
Consequences let through. Amortisation ~£71m → estimated ratio ~66% vs the 70% wall, headroom restated from the stale ~£8m/yr (~£40m of fees) to ~£12m/yr (~£60m of fees) — the old number predated yesterday's switch to squad-derived amortisation and had never been recomputed. Conditional add-ons across Rodríguez, Silva, Juanlu, Diakité and now Rayan restated ~£14.5m → ~£20m, which lifts the amber band on the amortisation runway. List A candidates rise ~22 → ~23 against an unchanged cap of 21–22, so for the first time there are more senior bodies than places. Lucumí downgraded to "going quiet" — no movement since Silva signed, and Sky's window round-up has the remaining shortlist as a No.6, a No.10 and possibly a winger, with the goalkeeper search dropped and no big departures anticipated.
Checked and deliberately NOT added. Pietro Comuzzo (Fiorentina) surfaces on Bournemouth searches, but the reporting is from August 2025, not this window — a previous window's rumour presented as current would be exactly the error this site exists to avoid. Arthur Avom (Lorient, out of contract, BKFC sister club) was widely reported in May–June as all but done, but no completion or collapse could be confirmed, so he is left off rather than guessed at. Dean Huijsen, Zabarnyi, Kerkez and the Semenyo sale keep resurfacing in searches as "2026" business; they are 2025 and January-2026 deals and stay where they are.
Methodology: squad-cost amortisation now derives from the squad contracts
The headroom model's amortisation input used to be a hand-maintained estimate, while the Squad tab computed the same thing bottom-up from every player's fee and contract dates. The two had drifted apart — by up to £29m across the league, which is several points of squad cost ratio on pages whose whole purpose is showing how close a club sits to a compliance line. The hero model now takes its amortisation straight from the squad contracts, so the headline ratio and the squad table can no longer disagree, and the figure updates itself whenever the squad data changes. The field is still editable: type over it and the what-if model responds as before. Wages remain a stated estimate — clubs publish total staff costs, not the players-plus-head-coach slice the rule needs, so that split is still this tracker's assumption and is labelled as one.
Full window rebuild from source 3 deals added
Method changed. Rather than looking only for news since the last update, the summer-2026 ins and outs were rebuilt from a complete source list (Transfermarkt/OneFootball club ledger, afcb.co.uk announcements, Sky Sports and the buying clubs' own releases) and then reconciled against what was on the page. Three completed deals were missing.
Added. Owen Bevan → Dundee, permanent, 28 July — a reported €200k (~£0.17m), unpublished by either club. As an academy centre-back he carries no book value, so the fee is effectively pure profit; window sales move £6.5m → £6.7m and the net balance from −£45.9m to −£45.7m. Romain Faivre → Auxerre, season-long loan announced by the club on 3 July, a second spell with no option to buy — Auxerre cover ~£30k/wk, but the residual amortisation on his £12.8m 2023 move from Lyon stays on Bournemouth's books, so this frees wages and nothing else. Both men have been added to the List A flow columns, which now read three defenders and two midfielders off the list. Luis Sinisterra → Cruzeiro was missing entirely: Cruzeiro triggered the purchase clause on 30 May 2026 for €3.5m (~£3m) on top of the €2.5m loan fee, ~£5.2m all-in. Because that completed before the window opened on 15 June it belongs to the 2025/26 ledger, not this window, and has been filed there — it does not touch the window net spend.
Consequences. Adding Bevan's fee and Faivre's freed wages moves annual cost freed from ~£10.4m to ~£12.3m and cuts the net SCR swing from ~+£12.0m/yr to ~+£10.1m/yr. Neither deal touches amortisation, so the squad cost ratio stays at ~67% and PSR headroom is unchanged — no confirmed deal has moved those. The league-wide window table's Bournemouth sales figure is updated to £6.7m.
Cross-check resolved. An automated sweep flagged Antoine Semenyo's Bournemouth → Manchester City move as having no counterpart on City's page. It is correctly recorded here: the £62.5m deal completed in January 2026, so it sits in the 2025/26 season table, not the summer-2026 window — presenting it as current business would be the error. Nothing changed. Also checked and deliberately NOT added: Zabarnyi (PSG), Huijsen (Real Madrid) and Kerkez (Liverpool) all surface in searches as "summer 2026" sales but are summer 2025 business and already sit in the 2025/26 table; Jaidon Anthony moved Burnley → Brentford and has not been a Bournemouth player since 2025; Alex Scott rejected a new contract but has not been sold.
Accuracy audit + the Benfica signing 14 corrections
Audit. Every named player, manager and rumour on the page was re-checked against reporting, and 14 things were wrong. The worst: David Brooks was listed as leaving on a free at the end of his contract — he actually signed a new deal in September 2025 running to June 2029 and is in the 26/27 squad, so he has been pulled out of the Outs table and added to the squad, the A-list and the association-trained count. Álex Jiménez was carried at a ~£8.5m "loan converting to permanent"; the permanent actually completed on 12 Feb 2026 for €19.5m + €5.3m on a deal to 2031, and his Fiorentina loan (16 Jul, not 14 Jul) carries a €20m option to buy — book value and amortisation corrected accordingly. Fraser Forster joined in January 2026 as a free agent, not August 2025, and his new one-year deal was announced 25 Jun. Daniel Jebbison is contracted to 2028, not 2027, and signed in 2024, not 2023. Two rumours were dead and have been removed: Nathan Aké has joined Fenerbahçe for an initial ~£7m, and Ousmane Diomande has agreed personal terms with Nottingham Forest. The CFCB fine round was 30 June 2026, not July (Villa €22.5m with €15m suspended, Chelsea €3m, Newcastle €3m SCR + €10m FER settlement, Forest €2.5m) — corrected in five places. FY25's £91m of sale profits were credited solely to Huijsen; Dominic Solanke's ~£65m move to Spurs fell in the same year and is now named. Paulsen's Motherwell loan was 13 Jul, Akinmboni's and Milosavljević's signing dates and fees were adjusted, and the £85m stadium figure has been hedged — the club briefs ~£50m, industry data says £85–90m.
New since 27 July. António Silva signed from Benfica on 31 July — €25m fixed plus up to €5m, a five-year deal to 2031, 22 years old and 20 Portugal caps. That closes the centre-back hunt that had dominated the page and takes confirmed window spend to £43m against £6.5m of sales. Juanlu Sánchez is agreed with Sevilla at €11m + €2m on a reported four-year deal, medical and announcement pending — carried as advanced, not done. The rumour mill is rebuilt around what is actually live: Alex Scott rejected a contract extension in late July, Bournemouth value him at ~£70m and knocked back an Arsenal enquiry while Manchester United walked away; Kroupi's price has moved from £40m to a reported £80m of Spurs/Arsenal interest that the club is refusing outright while offering him a new contract; Lucumí's bracket has fallen to ~€20m and Tiago Gabriel (Lecce) has been added. With Silva and Rodríguez on the books the model's amortisation input moves £70m → £75m, taking the estimated squad cost ratio from ~65% to ~67% and cutting headroom to ~£8m/yr (~£40m of further fees). League table club names expanded to their full official forms.
Page launched
The Bean Counter's AFC Bournemouth tracker goes live at bean-counter.co.uk/bournemouth — the club's first season under UEFA rules, bean-counted from day one. Baseline data loaded: FY25 accounts (£181.7m revenue, £158.4m staff costs, £91m sale profits, +£14.9m PBT, the £157.6m debt-to-equity conversion); the 2025/26 season ledger including the January Semenyo sale (£62.5m to Man City); summer-26 window to date (Rodríguez in £21.5m; Traoré, Senesi, Paulsen and Jiménez out); estimated squad book values and wages; the first-ever List A projection with the club-trained quota shortfall; the SCR model (est ~65% vs the 70% wall); the 2016→2018 EFL fine history; the Rumour Mill (Kroupi–Spurs, Kluivert–Juventus, the centre-back hunt); and the full 2026/27 deadline calendar.
Glossary
Every rule in this tracker, in plain English — each with a real Bournemouth example. For the group chat member who just asked "what's SCR?"
Arsenal
Manchester City
Manchester United
Aston Villa
Liverpool
AFC Bournemouth
Sunderland
Crystal Palace
Brighton & Hove Albion
Chelsea
Newcastle United
Tottenham Hotspur
Nottingham Forest
Everton
Fulham
Brentford
Leeds United
Coventry City
Ipswich Town
Hull City